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 Abstract  
This paper provides evidence on the migration from an “old” technology to a “new” 
technology, taking into account the impact that regulatory interventions on the old 
one might have on the incentives to invest and adopt the new one. This analysis has 
been applied to a sample of EU27 countries using panel data from 2004 to 2014 on 
the adoption, coverage and take-up rate of ultra-fast broadband infrastructures, 
whose development is one of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 programmes. 
Results show that a 1% increase in the regulated price to access the old technology 
increases the adoption and the investment on the new broadband technology by 
~0.45% and ~0.47%. These effects are not homogeneous across countries and are 
weakened in Eastern European countries, where the existing old broadband 
infrastructures are less developed than in the rest of Europe. It has also been shown 
that the access price to old networks negatively affects the take-up rate of the new 
technology-based services, thus calling for the need of more specific and 
complementary demand side policy incentives to enhance service adoption. 
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1 Introduction 
In a time of increasing digitalization, such as the one we are currently observing, 
operators of “old” (copper-wire and coaxial cable based) broadband networks are 
facing a huge increase in demand for bandwidth and real time criteria, due to the 
presence of interactive multimedia services such as streamed video on demand, file 
sharing, online gaming, and high definition television, as well as specific business 
applications, such as cloud computing services or video conferencing. As a 
consequence, the fibre-based deployment of ultra-fast broadband networks (”new” or 
“Next Generation Networks” – NGNs) that enable a massive increase in bandwidth 
capacity has become a major issue for regulators and telecom companies. The latter, 
however, have to sustain costly investments to upgrade the infrastructure, which is 
also fraught with high uncertainties as regards the future demand and regulatory 
policies. At the same time, NGNs can be considered as a general purpose 
technology (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995), which has the potential to trigger 
productivity gains and growth across major economic sectors, such as health, 
electricity and transport, on a massive scale.1  
In view of the expected externalities that are involved, the European Commission 
(EC) has decided to strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s economy by 
explicitly focusing on digital infrastructure and communication technologies. In order 
to reach the related growth and productivity potential of NGNs, the Digital Agenda for 
Europe (DAE) has specified goals in terms of network coverage and service 
adoption: The DAE “seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans will have access 
to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European 
households will subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps” (European 
Commission, 2010:19).2 While target (i) refers to a coverage level of 100 per cent of 
the population, target (ii) refers to a minimum household adoption level. However, 
recent market data (European Commission, 2014) have shown that both targets are 
unlikely to be met, unless substantial infrastructure investments are introduced in the 
coming years. Similar targets can be found in other jurisdictions outside the EU, such 
as the “National Broadband Network” and the “Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative“ in 
Australia and New Zealand, respectively, the “Digital Divide Closing Plan” in South-
Korea or the “Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan” in the US. 
What are the main drivers of ultra-fast broadband adoption and coverage in Europe? 
What is the role that the existing regulation can play on the old “legacy” (“copper-
wire”) network to foster NGN adoption and coverage? In this paper, an attempt has 
                                            
1
 Numerous studies support the view that investment in (old) broadband infrastructures creates 
positive effects on the economic system and leads to an increase in GDP growth (e.g. Röller & 
Waverman, 2001; Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer & Wößmann, 2011). In particular, Czernich et al. 
(2011) have shown that a 10% increase in the broadband adoption rate in OECD countries results in a 
1-1.5% increase in the annual GDP per-capita. 
2 
The DAE is one of the seven flagship initiatives under Europe 2020. For further details about the 
DAE, the reader can refer to the European Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/digital-agenda-europe. 
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been made to answer these questions. Using a recent EU27 panel data set for the 
years 2004 to 2014, and static and dynamic model specifications, the present work is 
the first that has simultaneously examines the determinants of NGN coverage, NGN 
adoption and the NGN take-up rate. The latter measure relates NGN adoption to 
NGN coverage. The role of the EU regulatory policies, as embedded in the sector-
specific framework of electronic communication markets, is examined, as well as the 
related market conditions, including relevant forms of competition within fixed 
broadband markets (“intramodal”) and from mobile networks (“intermodal”), 
deployment costs and demand characteristics. The market conditions in most of the 
European countries so far appear to be insufficient to trigger the broad-scale 
deployment of NGN. Accordingly, the focus of this work has been on examining 
regulatory policies more closely, in particular, the so-called “unbundling” price, which 
is the most relevant policy instrument in terms of incentivizing migration to NGNs 
pertaining to investment and adoption. Unbundling prices are set directly by national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) in individual member states subject to framework 
directives at the EU level (European Commission, 2000; European Commission, 
2002a; European Commission, 2002b). In view of the dual DAE policy goals, and in 
order to avoid inefficient NGN deployment, it is essential to identify the right 
regulatory policies. Therefore, the present paper examines how relevant broadband 
market regulations have an impact on both input-related NGN investment and output-
related NGN adoption, as well as their simultaneous impact on NGN take-up. 
The European policy goals are closely interrelated, since investment in NGN, i.e. 
network coverage, also depends on the (expected) adoption, i.e. (future) demand, 
which in turn is determined by the attractiveness of specific NGN services and 
applications. Only if consumers consider NGN services attractive enough, in terms of 
innovations or quality improvements compared with old broadband services, will they 
migrate to NGN. In this perspective, the take-up rate, is a useful indicator of the 
willingness of consumers to migrate to the new infrastructure. The more consumers 
are satisfied with conventional broadband services, or the more consumers are 
reluctant to adopt new technologies, the greater the gap will be with the newly 
installed network capacity. A high take-up rate, with adoption being close to capacity 
in terms of NGN coverage, avoids social costs due to over-capacities. For these 
reasons, the analysis also focuses on the NGN take-up rate, because of its primary 
role in the EU scenario, by empirically assessing its main determinants. In this 
perspective, this paper is the first to attempt to empirically assess the complex 
interplay between regulation on an old technology and investment and adoption of a 
new technology, as recently proposed in a theoretical framework by Bourreau, 
Cambini and Dogan (2012) and Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2014). 
Results show that the access price imposed on the old legacy infrastructure 
significantly affects both NGN adoption and coverage. In particular, results show that 
a 1% increase in the unbundling price increases NGN adoption and NGN investment 
by ~0.45% and ~0.47%, respectively. This implies that a policy measure that 
increases the cost of accessing the old broadband infrastructure, though affecting 
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competition, could exert a positive effect on incentivizing the deployment of a new 
fibre infrastructure (hence, expanding NGN coverage), but also on the adoption of 
the new connections, by reducing the gap between the retail prices between old and 
new technology based broadband services. However, and interestingly from a policy 
perspective, these effects are greatly reduced in Eastern European countries that are 
characterized by a lack of a well-developed legacy infrastructure: when controlling for 
this heterogeneity across countries, it has been found that the role of the unbundling 
regime is offset in Eastern European countries. This result casts doubts on the EC´s 
current policy of creating a single market in Europe with uniform regulatory rules to 
be applied in all countries. Clearly, the possible changes in the unbundling prices are 
only relevant in certain EU countries (mostly EU15), but not over the entire continent. 
Finally, the take-up rate estimations results have shown that increasing the price of 
the access price decreases the take-up rate, since adoption increases but less than 
proportionally to coverage. From a policy perspective, this implies that using a single 
instrument (i.e. the price for local loop unbundling, LLU) to influence both demand 
adoption and coverage is not enough, and other instruments are needed to support 
demand adoption, such as vouchers or tax deductions.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the NGN 
related literature, focusing in particular on empirical literature. Section 3 describes the 
basic hypotheses concerning the relationship between regulation and competition on 
NGN coverage, adoption and take-up. Section 4 outlines the panel dataset that 
underlies the empirical examination. Section 5 presents the empirical baseline 
specifications and the related econometric issues. Section 6 describes and interprets 
the main results. Section 7 summarises and compiles the most relevant trade-offs for 
policy makers. 
2 Literature review 
The economic literature on the migration from old to new broadband technology is 
relatively recent, and evidence on this phenomenon is relatively scant.  
The deployment of fibre infrastructures does not immediately replace copper or cable 
legacy networks, suggesting that the transition from old infrastructures to new 
infrastructures will go slowly. This implies that, during a transition phase, two different 
infrastructures will operate in parallel, and presumably each type of network will be 
regulated with a different set of rules. The incentives to invest in fibre infrastructures 
will therefore also be influenced by the terms of access set for the legacy copper 
networks.3 The recent theoretical literature (Bourreau et al., 2012; Bourreau et al., 
2014; Inderst & Peitz, 2012) has focused on how access regulations on an existing 
old network affect infrastructure investments in new networks and favour the 
migration, at a retail level, from the old to the new broadband infrastructure. 
                                            
3
 It should be noted that cable coax networks also constitute old broadband networks. However, only 
copper-wire based (“legacy”) networks have been subjected to sector-specific regulations, such as 
unbundling, in the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets. 
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The related empirical literature on NGN investment (coverage) is relatively scant. 
Minamihashi (2012) has examined whether unbundling regulations imposed on the 
Japanese incumbent operator have prevented entrants from self-deploying new 
broadband infrastructures, using municipal level data from 2005 to 2009. The author 
has found that unbundling regulations hinder entrants from investing in their own 
NGN infrastructure. However, during the analysed years, the incumbent’s NGN 
investments were not hindered by the unbundling regulations. Bacache, Bourreau 
and Gaudin (2014) have examined the incentives embedded in the EU regulatory 
framework on migration from old to new broadband infrastructures using biannual 
data from 15 European member states over a period from July 2002 to July 2010. 
The authors related the number of broadband lines based on new infrastructure to 
the number of unbundling lines and found that unbundling regulations did not foster 
entrants investing in NGN. Briglauer (2015) has examined the impact of broadband 
regulations, including the unbundling price, on NGN investment, utilizing EU27 panel 
data from 2004 to 2013. The author has found that, as the unbundling price 
increased, so did the average incentives for NGN investment. 
As far as NGN adoption is concerned, the existing empirical literature presents (i) 
several contributions related to old broadband markets, but only (ii) a few NGN-
related publications. Regarding point (i), several relatively old papers exist that have 
dealt with the determinants of broadband adoption in both the US and European 
countries. Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010) have examined the determinants 
of broadband adoption from 2003 to 2008 in OECD countries and have found that 
infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband adoption. The 
first paper to use EU data was that of Distaso, Lupi and Maneti (2006), who found 
that infrastructure-based competition was the main driver of broadband adoption and 
that it played a more important role than service-based competition, especially in the 
longer term. More recently, Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2015) have employed 
disaggregated broadband data related to the old telecom infrastructure in the UK for 
the period December 2005 to December 2009. The authors have shown that 
unbundling in the UK has not resulted in an increase in broadband adoption but has 
positively affected service quality. 
The above mentioned papers have shed some light on the impact of infrastructure-
based competition and access regulation on standard broadband adoption. However, 
although they are interesting, they are of limited interest for a better understanding of 
NGN adoption, where the presence of a relatively good legacy infrastructure may 
represent a constraint to the development of NGN adoption. There are very few 
papers that deal with NGN demand adoption (point (ii)). Wallsten and Hausladen 
(2009) have estimated the effects of broadband regulations on NGN adoption with 
data from EU27 countries from 2002 to 2007, thus covering the very early market 
phase. They have found that countries where unbundling is more effective 
experience lower NGN adoption. In their paper, the authors only examined the 
presence of unbundling regulation, but did not provide any evidence on the possible 
impact of the price of unbundling access on NGN adoption. Samanta, Martin, Guild 
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and Pan (2012) have examined the demand-side determinants of high-speed 
broadband deployment using International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and 
OECD data for 25 countries (for the years) from 1999 to 2009. The authors employed 
a dummy variable to capture the extent of unbundling regulation and found that this 
variable had no significant impact. More recently, Briglauer (2014) has investigated 
the determinants of NGN adoption for EU27 member states from 2004 to 2013. The 
author has found that the more effective the previous broadband access regulation 
was, the more negative the impact on adoption. He also found that competitive 
pressure from mobile networks affects adoption in a non-linear manner.  
It should be pointed out that none of the above papers analysed the cross price effect 
of an old network, i.e. a change in the local loop unbundling price on NGN adoption. 
This type of analysis can be considered extremely important since, as the theoretical 
models show, the consumers’ migration, at the retail level, from old broadband 
connections to fibre-based connections depends on the relative price difference 
between the NGN retail services and the standard broadband ones. In fact, when the 
access price of the legacy network is low, the retail prices for the services that rely on 
this network are also low. Hence, in order to encourage customers to switch from the 
legacy network, operators would need to introduce low-priced NGN services. 
Furthermore, none of the existing empirical studies has analyzed the determinants of 
the NGN take-up rate. As mentioned in the introduction, the latter is an important 
indicator of consumer willingness to adopt new services, of capacity utilization and of 
the extent to which policy targets are achieved. 
Overall, the present paper has the aim of examining the potential role of regulation 
on stimulating both policy goals, i.e., coverage and adoption. In order to provide 
useful information to the policy debate, the impact on NGN coverage and NGN 
adoption is estimated as well as the impact on the NGN take-up rate in separate 
regressions. 
3 Hypotheses 
As outlined in the introduction, the key policy variable of interest is the regulated 
wholesale access price to the old (legacy) infrastructure, i.e. the local loop 
unbundling price. The current policy debate is focused on how to revise the 
regulation of this wholesale price in order to foster both ultra-fast broadband 
coverage and adoption by end users. In fact, the EC is currently modifying the 
regulatory framework in order to fulfill the EU targets defined within the DAE 
program.4 The present analysis thus focuses on this key variable. 
                                            
4
 The reader can refer to the relevant recommendations of the European Commission related to 
regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks (2010/572) and non-discrimination and costing 
methodologies (2013/466), as well as to the current public consultation on the review of the regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services (information available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-evaluation-and-review-regulatory-
framework-electronic-communications). 
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To this aim, it is important to derive sound testable hypotheses from the recent 
theoretical literature on the economics of technology migration. The first systematic 
theoretical analysis on this issue was provided by Bourreau et al. (2012) and 
Bourreau et al. (2014). The authors consider a model in which access to the legacy 
copper network is available throughout an entire country, and an incumbent that is 
subject to access regulation on the old network, and an (unregulated) entrant 
operator competes for the provision of retail broadband services to consumers by 
investing in a new ultra-fast broadband infrastructure. The entrant operator could also 
demand access in the form of LLU. Their main results show that NGN coverage 
varies non-monotonically with the LLU access price. This result is due to the 
coexistence of three different effects: (i) the “replacement effect”, which hinders 
infrastructure investment by alternative operators when the access price is low; (ii) 
the “wholesale revenue effect”, which discourages the incumbent from investing in a 
higher quality network when the access price is high (since the entrant may invest in 
reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some of its wholesale profits); and finally 
(iii) the “business migration effect”: when the LLU access price is low, the retail prices 
of the services that rely on the copper network are also low. Therefore, in order to 
encourage customers to switch from an old to NGN services, operators should also 
offer low prices for the NGN services. This effect reduces the profitability of the NGN 
infrastructure, and hence, the incentives to invest in it. 
From this analysis, four different testable hypotheses can be drawn. First, the effect 
of the access price on the investment in the new technology networks is in general 
ambiguous. As pointed out, three effects are at play and the aggregate NGN 
coverage generally varies non-monotonically with the access price of the copper 
network. This nonlinear effect emerges mainly from the so-called wholesale revenue 
effect (Bourreau et al., 2012), which discourages the incumbent from investing in a 
higher quality network when the access price is high in order not to jeopardize the 
extra-return they can obtain from providing access to their old infrastructures to third 
parties. In other words, while increasing access to old networks would incentivize not 
only the entrants but also the incumbents to invest in new infrastructures, and would 
favour the consumers to switch to adopting the new technology based services, the 
extra-return on the old legacy infrastructure would limit the incentives of the 
incumbents to invest. This implies that the effect of an increase in the access price is 
not clear a priori, unless it would be possible to control for the wholesale revenue 
effect; if this were possible, the following testable hypothesis would emerge: 
H1: Assuming that it is possible to control the wholesale revenue effect, 
an increase in the regulated access price to the old technology would 
boost the new technology investment and expand its coverage. 
Second, regarding NGN adoption, an issue that is extremely important and that may 
affect consumer migration, at a retail level, from the standard copper infrastructures 
to NGN connections, is the relative price difference between the NGN retail services 
and the standard broadband ones. Indeed, when the access price on the legacy 
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network is low, the prices of the services that rely on this network are also low. 
Hence, in order to encourage customers to move away from the legacy network, 
operators would need to introduce low-priced NGN offers. The latter effect, which is 
referred to as the business migration effect, implies that the access price on copper 
networks (i.e. the LLU price) may have a considerable effect on NGN adoption: 
assuming that the retail market for copper-based broadband services is substantially 
competitive, any increase in the cost of LLU prices would be translated into a higher 
cost of the basic broadband connections, thus making it less attractive than the NGN-
based services. The following can therefore be tested: 
H2: An increase in the regulated access prices to the old technology 
would make old broadband services similar to the new technology based 
services, and as a result the adoption of the latter would increase.  
An analysis of the take-up rate, which relates NGN adoption to NGN coverage seems 
less insightful because the adoption and coverage of the new infrastructures, as 
tested in the previous hypotheses, are simply being compared. However, as pointed 
out in the main Introduction, this index is not only a useful indicator of the willingness 
of consumers to migrate to a new infrastructure, but also the key policy variable used 
by the EC to define specific targets, in terms of NGN adoption and coverage, and 
implicitly also to define the take-up rate target. As shown in Hypotheses 1 and 2, it 
could be expected – after controlling for specific effects – that both adoption and 
coverage would be positively affected by an increase in the access price to the old 
networks and therefore the expected effect of this price on the take-up rate is ex ante 
indeterminate. The following can therefore be tested: 
H3: The impact of an increase in the regulated access price to the old 
technology on the take-up rate of the new technology depends on the 
incremental effect of such a price increase on the new technology 
adoption rate and coverage.  
Finally, the above hypotheses hold for countries in which the old legacy infrastructure 
is well established on a nation-wide scale. In those countries, the access price to this 
infrastructure plays a relevant role. However, in countries where the legacy network 
is not very well developed, mostly for historical reasons, the role of the access price 
on the new technology coverage and adoption should be weaker. The following 
hypothesis emerges: 
H4: In countries in which the presence of the old legacy technology is 
limited, an increase in the access price to the old technology should play 
a minor role in incentivizing the coverage and the adoption of the new 
technology.  
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4 Data 
In the empirical analysis, country level panel data for EU27 member states from 2004 
to 2014 have been considered. The data have been gathered from several different 
sources: FTTH Council Europe5 provides annual NGN coverage and adoption data 
from 2004 to 2014, thus covering almost the entire period of NGN deployment in EU 
member states. NGN coverage and adoption data also form the basis of the NGN 
take-up rate and the NGN gap measure, as discussed in section 4.1. Owing to the 
fact that some values are missing, there are fewer observations than the maximum 
number of 297 (27×11).6 Furthermore, any unrealistically high take-up rates ≥ 0.75 
which have occasionally been observed at the beginning of the NGN deployment in 
Spain, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom from 2004 up to 2006, as well as in 
Greece from 2007 up to 2010 have been dropped. Generally, it is possible to 
observe, from Figures A.1 and A.2, that NGN take-up rates are significantly higher at 
the very beginning of NGN deployment, i.e. in the years from 2004 to 2007. One 
obvious explanation might be that NGN were initially deployed in areas in which there 
was a very high demand (e.g. universities, public administrations, large businesses, 
residential consumers with high willingness to pay), which resulted in a high adoption 
of installed NGN connections and hence in high take-up rates. Furthermore, during 
the first years of NGN deployment, many field experiments were conducted by 
operators in which the consumers were either volunteers or they obtained special 
offers (in some cases without having to pay any extra price). Hence, a very high take-
up rate can be observed with respect to the selected and targeted consumers, which, 
at the same time constituted a substantial segment of the market.  
As regards the independent variables, the EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard7 provides 
yearly data on broadband regulations. As for the competition variables, the data on 
intermodal competition from mobiles (“wireless”) and intramodal broadband 
competition (“wireline”) have been provided by Euromonitor,8 the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU)9 and the EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard. 
Euromonitor also provides data on the number of households and on the Networked 
                                            
5
 These data are available to FTTH Council Europe members at: 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6.  
6
 There is basically no data for Malta and Cyprus on NGN deployment for the entire period of interest 
and these countries have therefore been excluded. Data on NGN coverage are also missing for the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom in 2004, for Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia in 2004 and 2005, and for Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary 
and Bulgaria for a time span of up to five years starting from 2004. 
7
 The EU “Digital Agenda Scoreboard” is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.ht. 
Values are missing for Bulgaria for the years from 2003 to 2006, for Romania from 2003 to 2004, for 
Estonia for 2003 and 2012, as well as for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia for 2003. 
8
 The Euromonitor International database is commercially available at: http://www.euromonitor.com/. 
Telecommunication revenue values are missing for the Netherlands for the year 2003, for Greece for 
2013 and for Romania and Slovenia for both 2003 and 2004.  
9
 The ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicator Database is available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/. 
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Readiness Index. Eurostat10 provides data on education and ICT labour costs. 
Market Line11 provides data on the percentage of urban population and population 
density. Finally, World Bank12 and the International Monetary Fund13 provide data on 
GDP, and the European Central Bank has provided data on the long-term interest 
rates.14 All the independent variables (discussed in section 4.2) are available for the 
years from 2003 to 2013. As the data availability differs according to the variable, an 
unbalanced panel data set has been employed.15 
The variable descriptions are listed in the Annex in Table A.1 and Table A.2, 
respectively, together with the data sources and summary statistics. 
4.1 Dependent variables 
NGN coverage, NGN_cov, measures the total number of deployed lines normalized 
to the total number of households (“homes passed”). Network coverage thus 
represents the installed capacity, in physical units, where the term “homes passed” 
refers to the number of consumers with potential access to NGN infrastructure. On 
the other hand, the variable NGN adoption, NGN_adop, measures the total number 
of consumers (normalized to households) who subscribe to at least one service 
offered via the NGN connection on a commercial basis (“homes connected”). 
The NGN take-up rate, NGN_tur, is the ratio between NGN adoption and NGN 
coverage, and thus ranges continuously in the [0;1] interval, as adoption cannot be 
higher than the installed capacity. In the case of optimal network utilization, the 
variable takes on the value of one. However, the denominator of NGN_tur, i.e., 
NGN_cov, is not in the [0;1] interval, as household coverage is already above 100% 
in some member states. This is due to a parallel coverage with the NGN 
infrastructure, in particular in urban areas, where homes are supplied with both cable 
and traditional telecommunication operators. However, the saturation level for NGN 
adoption is 100%, as households normally will not subscribe to multiple connections, 
considering the huge bandwidth capacity of a single NGN connection. In order to 
capture this asymmetry in maximum adoption and coverage levels, an alternative 
take-up measure has been defined as a robustness variable, that is, NGN_gap, 
which indicates the difference between NGN coverage and NGN adoption in absolute 
terms, where the upper bound of the variable NGN_cov is set equal to one.  
                                            
10
 Data are available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/-
data/database. A few values are missing for the Austrian, Italian and Swedish dwelling permits,, as 
well as for the labour cost variables for Ireland and Greece. Networked Readiness Index values are 
also missing for Malta and Cyprus for 2003 and for Romania for 2006. Values pertaining to the number 
of internet users for Greece are missing (for the years) from 2011 to 2013. 
11
 Data are commercially available at: 
http://advantage.marketline.com/PageForbidden?returnUrl=%2F. 
12
 The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” are available at: http://data.worldbank.org. 
13
 Data are available at: http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm. 
14
 Values are missing for the long-term interest rate of Romania (for the years) from 2003 to 2005.  
15
 In addition, there are some gaps in the raw data and the corresponding missing data had to be 
linearly interpolated. Overall, ~0.8% of all the raw data were calculated using linear interpolation or 
had to be extrapolated constantly for the future.  
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NGN coverage and adoption rates follow an investment adjustment and diffusion 
process, respectively, as evidenced by the related empirical literature, Figure A.1, 
pertaining to EU27 countries, and the two sub-groups of EU15 and Eastern 
European Countries16 in Figure A.2, show that the NGN take-up rate does not follow 
a specific growth pattern but instead fluctuates around average mean values 
throughout most of the analysis period. It should also be noted that the mean of the 
NGN take-up rate is well below the target take-up rate implied by the DAE (i.e., 0.5). 
The graphical evidence suggests that, while coverage seems to present a rather 
similar trend across EU countries, adoption and the take-up rate of NGN services are 
larger in Eastern European countries where the presence of the old legacy 
infrastructure is limited or even absent, and where any regulatory policies towards a 
revision of the access prices to the legacy infrastructure appears to be less relevant.  
4.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables can be divided into four categories: (i) regulation; (ii) 
competition; (iii) controls; and (iv) time period- and country fixed effects. 
(i) The monthly unbundling access price, measured in €, llu_price, is the most 
relevant form of (wholesale) broadband regulation when considering migration from 
old to new broadband networks, and which is set directly by NRAs. However, as 
Bacache et al. (2014:205-206) pointed out, only a few unbundling price changes 
were imposed by NRAs in the past, which makes identification of the overall effect 
difficult. In order to circumvent this problem, an additional unbundling variable has 
been introduced by referring to a measure that captures the effectiveness of the 
unbundling regime (Briglauer, 2015). Accordingly, the variable, i_price_llu_sh, 
combines the unbundling price, llu_price, with the respective unbundling market 
share, ms_llu. The latter is bound between 0 and 1, where the upper limit indicates 
that all the retail broadband connections are offered via unbundling. This variable 
also provides a better representation of the overall complexity of unbundling regimes 
which include several other institutional and technical regulations besides the 
monthly access charge. Overall, both variables, llu_price and i_price_llu_sh have 
been used as our main regulatory variables.  
Furthermore, the variable sa_price is used as an instrumenting variable; this variable 
represents the monthly cost of “shared access”, measured in €. Whereas unbundling 
provides full LLU access to the incumbent´s access lines, shared access only 
provides limited access to the upper line bandwidth. Accordingly, the regulated price 
of shared access products represents approximately one half of the unbundling price 
(see Table A.2). Hence, a change in shared access prices should not induce entrants 
to switch to much more cost intense self-provision of the NGN infrastructure, whereas 
the unbundling price – which represents the most investment intense business case 
for entrants – has an impact on the entrant´s investment decision at the margin. At 
                                            
16
 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia have been included in the East European country group. Hence, the EU15 group includes all 
other EU27 member states, except Malta and Cyprus.  
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the same time, shared access and unbundling prices are closely related, since both 
are determined by NRAs on the basis of (common) network costs. As the latter 
represent about 60-80% of the total costs (ERG, 2007), our regulatory variables, in 
particular the unbundling price, also represent a valid proxy of the average retail 
broadband price. 
(ii) Three variables are related to competition in retail broadband markets: the first 
one stems from mobile networks (“intermodal” wireless competition). In order to 
account for mobile network competition, the variable fms, which relates the total 
number of mobile subscriptions to the total number of fixed landlines, has been used. 
The second competition variable, bb_ne, represents the entrant's retail market share 
in fixed broadband lines, and thus the impact of wireline (“intramodal”) competition on 
old broadband markets on emerging NGN markets. Thirdly, the legacy variable 
measures a country’s total stock of fixed-linked copper-wire connections, and it is 
therefore able to directly capture the replacement effect for the incumbent that stems 
from all wholesale and retail services of the incumbent´s old network infrastructure. 
Accordingly, this variable also captures the wholesale revenue effect as defined in 
Section 3. 
(iii) A broad set of demand and cost controls, Z, have also been included, in line 
with the previous empirical literature, and on the basis of industry knowledge (e.g. 
FTTH Council Europe, 2013: 36-47). A detailed description of all the controls can be 
found in Table A.1 in the Annex. 
(iv) Finally, period effects, δ, and country fixed-effects, θ, have also been 
considered. Including period effects makes it possible to control for relevant industry 
developments that are common to all EU27 member states throughout the entire 
period of analysis, such as different market phases or changes in equipment and 
material prices, which are determined by industry standards and global markets. The 
fixed effects are related to some of the main cost conditions, such as the topographic 
and demographic characteristics. Likewise, supply- and demand-oriented NGN 
subsidies, once having been determined by local or national governments, generally 
stay in place for a longer period of time.  
5 Empirical specifications 
In view of the different diffusion patterns and the interdependencies underlying the 
dependent variables, a two-fold research strategy has been employed: the empirical 
baseline specifications for the separate regressions of the NGN investment and the 
adoption models have been presented in section 5.1. Although any adoption and 
investment process is inherently dynamic, the development of the NGN take-up rates 
points to a static baseline specification, which has been outlined in Section 5.2. The 
adopted estimation and identification strategy has been described in Section 5.3. 
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5.1 Dynamic NGN investment and adoption models 
According to the ICT related empirical literature, the dynamics of the adoption 
process, which is due to network effects or consumer inertia, as well as of the 
investment process, which is mainly determined by the extent of adjustment costs, 
can be captured by including the lagged dependent variable as an additional right-
hand side explanatory variable (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Grajek & Röller, 2011). In 
view of the discussion presented in sections 3 and 4, the dynamic reduced-form 
models, in which NGN investment (superscript c denotes coverage in equation 1) and 
NGN adoption (superscript a denotes adoption in equation 2) are expressed in logs17 
for EU member state i and year t, read as follows: 
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The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables measure the constant speed of 
diffusion )1( 1
a  and the speed of adjustment )1( 1
c  in the NGN adoption and 
NGN investment specifications, respectively. The dynamic specifications are correct, 
and give rise to an endogenous growth process if 0 < α1 < 1. Equation (1) and 
equation (2) also depend on the main variables of interest, i.e., regulation, in terms of 
the variables ln(llu_pricei(t-1)) and ln(i_price_llu_shi(t-1)), and competition, in terms of 
the variables fmsi(t-1), bb_nei(t-1) and legacyi(t-1). In order to estimate the potential non-
linear relations as regards competition variables, squared terms of the variables, 
related to intermodal (fmsi(t-1)) and intramodal (bb_nei(t-1)) competition, have also been 
included in our baseline specifications (Schmutzler & Sacco, 2011). Furthermore, a 
vector of controls, Zi(t-1), with demand controls and cost controls has been included in 
the adoption and coverage baseline equations, respectively. Finally, εit and φit 
represent additive error terms, θi´s country-specific effects and λt´s period effects.  
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 A log transformation helps to stabilize the series of dependent variables and is also necessary to 
capture the dynamics of the data generating diffusion and adjustment processes adequately. In order 
to be able to interpret the main variables of interest in terms of elasticities, the variables related to the 
unbundling price have also been expressed as a logarithm in the dynamic specifications.  
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5.2 Static NGN Take-Up Rate model 
As the take-up rate does not exhibit an endogenous adjustment process (Figure A.1), 
modelling a static specification appears to be a reasonable choice. The empirical 
baseline specification for the NGN take-up rate model, NGN_turit, for EU member 
state i and year t, reads as follows: 
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Equation (3) contains the same list of explanatory variables as in the dynamic 
specifications, except for the lagged-dependent variable ( 01 
tur ) and the fact that 
equation (3) controls for both demand and cost shifters, 
a
ti )1( Z  and 
c
ti )1( Z . It should be 
noted that equations (1)-(3) include lagged values of all the explanatory variables in 
order to employ the entire available data set (as described in section 4).18,19 
5.3 Estimation and identification strategy 
In order to identify causal effects, two-way fixed-effect regressions have been 
employed to control for potential endogeneity due to unobserved and time-constant 
heterogeneity at the country level (θ) as well as period effects (λ) to control for any 
time specific shocks that are common to all cross-sectional units (member states). 
However, estimating equations (1) and (2) by means of an ordinary fixed-effect 
(least-squares-dummy-variable, LSDV) estimator, would yield inconsistent and 
biased results, since the lagged dependent variable and the error terms that include 
the fixed effects would be correlated (Nickell, 1981). In order to identify the 
parameters of the dynamic models, a bias-corrected fixed-effect estimator (LSDVC), 
developed by Bruno (2005a) and Bruno (2005b) specifically for dynamic unbalanced 
panel data, and a small number of cross-sectional units (N = 25), has been 
employed.  
Second, by lagging all the explanatory variables, the dependent variables in 
equations (1)-(3) are related to the pre-determined values of the independent 
variables, which mitigates endogeneity due to time-variant heterogeneity if the model 
is dynamically complete, i.e. in the absence of serial correlations. Although pre-
                                            
18
 Moreover, it also makes sense to assume that adoption and investment decisions at a particular 
point in time do depend on the conditions of the latter period, in view of switching and adjustment 
costs on the side of consumers and operators, respectively. Investing firms are faced with rigidities 
related to the legal and institutional framework, as well as technical complexities of NGN deployment, 
and consumers of broadband services are usually subjected to long term contracts (up to two years) 
and non-transparent tariff structures. 
19
 For the sake of clarity, the indices have been dropped in the remainder of the paper. 
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determinedness, or sequential exogeneity, is in fact reasonable for dynamic 
autoregressive models, such as those in equations (1) and (2) (Wooldridge, 2002: 
299-300), serial correlation in the static specification (equation (3)) has to be 
addressed in a different way. The nature of a serial correlation is first examined and 
then the serial components are removed using a suitable data transformation. 
Third, to rule out potential endogeneity due to reverse causality, Granger causality 
tests (Granger, 1969) have been also performed. The results, which are reported in 
Table A.3 in the Annex, indicate that there is no evidence of reverse causality.20  
Fourth, a large number of demand and cost controls have been employed in order to 
further reduce any remaining omitted variable bias that might be due to time-variant 
heterogeneity.  
Finally, as parts of the robustness specifications, the main regulatory variable, 
llu_price, has been instrumented with the sa_price variable as well as with some 
other exogenous cost shifters. 
6 Empirical Results 
According to the aforementioned two-fold research strategy, the results of the 
dynamic models are first discussed in Section 6.1 and those of the static take-up rate 
model are given in Section 6.2. The estimation results of the individual models on 
NGN coverage and adoption also provide important information for the interpretation 
of the estimation results pertaining to the take-up rate model. Finally, additional 
estimations are presented in Section 6.3 in order to examine the robustness of the 
main estimation results.21 
6.1 Dynamic NGN investment and adoption models 
Table 1 and Table 2 report the results of the LSDVC estimations of various NGN 
investment and adoption models. The models reported in regressions (2)-(4) 
represent deviations from the baseline specifications (regression (1)) as outlined in 
equations (1) and (2) in terms of different selections of controls and unbundling 
variables. 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables, 
a
1  and 
c
1 , are highly 
significant and substantial in all the regressions in both the investment and adoption 
                                            
20
 Granger causality tests require stationary time series. In order to formally test for stationarity, a 
“Fisher-type” (Augmented Dickey–Fuller) unit-root test, which has been designed for unbalanced 
panels, has been performed. This test rejects the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots for 
all the variables used in our model specifications (the results are available upon request from the 
authors; however, owing to the low number of observations (T = 11), the power of this test is limited).  
21
 Stata/IC 13.0 has been used to estimate all the regressions. Before running the regressions, a 
check was made on the bivariate correlations between the explanatory variables. Since two variables 
with high bivariate correlation produce inefficient estimates, they were excluded in the case of a higher 
correlation coefficient than 0.85. 
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models, thus indicating that the dynamic specification is correct. The coefficients 
have been estimated quite precisely and are slightly larger in the adoption 
regressions. This is in line with the previous literature, and suggests that consumer 
inertia and switching costs are even more pronounced than adjustment costs. 
As far as the unbundling price, ln(llu_price), is concerned, the coefficient estimates 
are insignificant in all the regressions in Table 1 and Table 2. As indicated in section 
4.2, this might be due to the low degree of variation in the unbundling price variable. 
However, the variable ln(i_price_llu_sh) shows a significantly positive impact on both 
NGN adoption and NGN investment. In particular, a 1% increase in the unbundling 
price increases NGN adoption and NGN investment by ~0.45% and ~0.47%, 
respectively.22 These results are in line with the expectations (Hypotheses 1 and 2), 
as the wholesale revenue effect is explicitly controlled for by including the variable 
legacy. It has also been tested whether the Eastern European countries (East = 1) 
that lacked a well-developed legacy infrastructure prior to NGN deployment exhibit a 
less pronounced effect of the unbundling regime. As expected (Hypothesis 4), from 
the coefficient of the variable ln(i_price_llu_sh_East), it can be inferred that this effect 
is offset in Eastern European countries. Accordingly, a 1% increase in the unbundling 
price in regressions (4) of the coverage and adoption specifications implies an almost 
null marginal increase in coverage (~ 0.1% percentage points) and adoption (0.13%). 
In fact, Wald-type tests indicate that the coefficients of both linear and interactions 
terms are jointly insignificant, indicating that the effect of the unbundling price is de 
facto neutralized in Eastern European countries.  
Moreover, the cross-price effect of the unbundling price on NGN adoption is of 
particular interest, because of the lack of evidence within the existing economic 
literature. Srinuan, Srinuan and Bohlin (2012) have developed an empirical 
investigation to analyze direct and cross-price elasticity among different types of 
broadband access technologies (xDSL, cable, fibre, mobile broadband). Data was 
obtained from a random nationwide postal mail survey of Swedish households 
between August and September 2009, with 2038 respondents. The results show that 
the cross-price elasticity of demand for fibre, in relation to the DSL price, is 3.289. A 
recent study by Grzybowski, Nitsche, Verboven and Wiethaus (2015) has used a 
large database from a survey of 6446 households in Slovakia between April-July 
2011 to estimate own- and cross- price elasticity of demand for different broadband 
technologies (DSL, fibre, cable, WiFi and mobile broadband access). The results 
show that a 1% increase in DSL price would increase the demand for fibre by 
between 0.66% (at a country level) and 0.96% (at a municipality level), thus 
indicating a cross-price elasticity of demand for fibre, in relation to DSL, of 0.66-0.96. 
The present results on an EU level sample, which is more extensive than that of the 
previous papers, are consistent with the aforementioned studies as they point out the 
presence of a business migration effect from the old to the new technology 
infrastructure. 
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 Note that totally differentiating with respect to the unbundling price yields the constant elasticity as 
captured by the coefficient β2 which is independent of the unbundling market share. 
~ 16 ~ 
As far as the competition variables are concerned, no significant pattern for 
intermodal (fms) or intramodal competition (bb_ne) has been found in either type of 
model. Regressions with significant estimates have indicated a negative impact of 
intramodal competition on NGN coverage (regression (1)) and NGN adoption in 
regression (4) and of intermodal competition with respect to NGN adoption 
(regressions (2) and (4)). To the extent that these competition variables capture 
market outcomes in terms of retail prices, the negative relationships can be seen as 
evidence of the business migration effect. Similarly, competition stemming from the 
old infrastructure (legacy) exerts a significantly negative impact on NGN investment 
and adoption in almost all regression specifications. This indicates that a well-
established infrastructure also exerts a substantial replacement effect on the side of 
infrastructure operators (Table 1) and substantial switching costs on the side of 
consumers (Table 2). When the coefficient estimates are compared, it appears that 
the replacement effect is more severe on the supply side. However, the replacement 
effect is mitigated if the legacy infrastructure in Eastern European countries, as 
measured by the interaction term i_legacy_East, is considered explicitly, thus again 
confirming the expectations of Hypothesis 4. 
As regards the cost and demand controls, the signs of all the significant coefficient 
estimates are in line with the basic economic theory. Moreover, the coefficient 
estimates of the main variables of interest also appear to be robust towards 
alternative selections of control variables in Table 1 and Table 2. Furthermore, if the 
demand and cost controls are added to the NGN coverage and NGN adoption 
baseline model (“base”), the main results do not change. Overall, regressions (4) in 
Table 1 and Table 2 can be considered as the final estimations as they also cover 
the heterogeneity of EU member states as regards the initial conditions for NGN 
deployment. Comparing these regressions, it emerges that the size of the old 
broadband market, ln(bb_lines), which proxies total willingness to pay for ICT 
services, has a significantly positive impact on both NGN adoption and NGN 
investment. As regards the adoption model, it can also be inferred that adoption of 
old broadband services, adop_bb_lines, counteracts this effect. Indeed, in the case in 
which conventional broadband services enjoy broad consumer acceptance, in terms 
of quality characteristics and high market saturation, the switching costs might be 
substantial and hinder consumer migration to NGN services.  
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Table 1: Dynamic investment model (Dependent var.: ln(NGN_cov)) 
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 base full Eastern_1 Eastern_2 
Lag: ln(NGN_cov) 0.6415*** 0.5960*** 0.5647*** 0.5752*** 
 (8.04) (7.58) (7.20) (7.27) 
Lag: ln(llu_price) 0.1703 0.5633 0.3322 0.0854 
 (0.28) (0.99) (0.56) (0.15) 
Lag: ln(i_price_llu_sh) 0.2159** 0.2293** 0.4506*** 0.4745*** 
 (2.05) (2.12) (2.62) (2.75) 
Lag:    -0.3886* -0.3732* 
ln(i_price_llu_sh_East)   (-1.71) (-1.66) 
Lag: fms -0.5297 -1.1199 -0.8736 -0.6778 
 (-0.77) (-1.61) (-1.22) (-0.96) 
Lag: fms2 0.0404 0.0709 0.0570 0.0450 
 (0.86) (1.51) (1.19) (0.94) 
Lag: bb_ne 12.2182 1.9307 0.0559 -3.1084 
 (1.63) (0.23) (0.01) (-0.36) 
Lag: bb_ne2 -18.0555** -8.7270 -6.1103 -2.5497 
 (-2.26) (-1.01) (-0.70) (-0.29) 
Lag: legacy -0.0722* -0.1079** -0.1100** -0.1214*** 
 (-1.67) (-2.35) (-2.40) (-2.65) 
Lag: i_legacy_East    0.1426** 
    (2.19) 
Lag: urban_pop 0.0659 0.1741 0.1783 0.0903 
 (0.41) (1.01) (1.05) (0.51) 
Lag: wage -0.1920 -0.3756*** -0.4137*** -0.4735*** 
 (-1.63) (-2.95) (-3.29) (-3.70) 
Lag: labcost_ict -0.0358** -0.0315** -0.0309** -0.0345** 
 (-2.31) (-2.08) (-2.03) (-2.30) 
Lag: gdp  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (-1.03) (-1.45) (-1.27) 
Lag: ln(bb_lines)  0.6641 0.8547* 1.2482** 
  (1.40) (1.85) (2.32) 
Lag: edu  0.0090*** 0.0106*** 0.0100*** 
  (2.62) (3.10) (2.95) 
Lag: nri  -1.2984 -1.3285 -1.1536 
  (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.34) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within) 0.8213 0.8364 0.8431 0.8478 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.301 0.274 0.260 0.384 
Observations 178 178 178 178 
The LSDVC standard errors in regressions (1)-(4) have been bootstrapped with bias correction 
initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) for estimates. Note that there 
are no standard post-estimation tests available in STATA for the user written “xtlsdvc” command 
(Bruno, 2005b). Therefore, the R
2
 within has been provided on the basis of an LSDV regression with a 
lagged dependent variable. Moreover, a specification test, based on the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals, has also been provided. If the assumption of serial independence in 
the original errors, ε´s and φ´s, is correct, the transformed residuals should not show any significant 
AR(2) test statistics. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table 2: Dynamic adoption model (Dependent var.: ln(NGN_adop)) 
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 base fms full Eastern 
Lag: ln(NGN_adop) 0.6533*** 0.6464*** 0.6431*** 0.6270*** 
 (12.32) (11.38) (11.35) (12.34) 
Lag: ln(llu_price) -0.4199 -0.3805 -0.6332 -0.6661 
 (-0.97) (-0.87) (-1.46) (-1.42) 
Lag: ln( i_price_llu_sh) 0.2877*** 0.2987*** 0.2920*** 0.4488*** 
 (3.85) (4.17) (4.15) (4.26) 
Lag:     -0.3147** 
ln(i_price_llu_sh_East)    (-2.12) 
Lag: fms -0.4413 -0.2642** -0.1513 -0.1824* 
 (-1.10) (-2.41) (-1.31) (-1.66) 
Lag: fms2 0.0122    
 (0.43)    
Lag: bb_ne 1.2408 -0.6535 4.7136 -3.7940*** 
 (0.21) (-0.11) (0.79) (-2.78) 
Lag: bb_ne2 -5.4528 -3.3921 -9.0910  
 (-0.96) (-0.61) (-1.59)  
Lag: legacy -0.0578** -0.0421* -0.0437* -0.0337 
 (-2.30) (-1.87) (-1.80) (-1.35) 
Lag: gdp -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.95) (-1.32) (-1.56) (-1.46) 
Lag: ln(bb_lines) 0.5685* 0.3020 0.4584 1.1270** 
 (1.73) (0.68) (1.06) (2.46) 
Lag: adop_bb_lines    -3.0634* 
    (-1.76) 
Lag: edu 0.0863*** 0.0729** 0.0347 0.0011 
 (2.91) (2.26) (0.98) (0.43) 
Lag: nri 0.0109 -0.6091 -0.1894 -0.2750 
 (0.04) (-1.20) (-0.36) (-0.53) 
Lag: labcost_ict   -0.0233** -0.0263*** 
   (-2.44) (-2.95) 
Lag: urban_pop   0.1770 0.2148* 
   (1.59) (1.95) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within) 0.8625 0.8695 0.8770 0.8810 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.376 0.714 0.692 0.631 
Observations 196 196 196 196 
The LSDVC standard errors in regressions (1)-(4) have been bootstrapped with bias correction 
initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) for estimates. Note that there 
are no standard post-estimation tests available in STATA for the user written “xtlsdvc” command 
(Bruno, 2005b). Therefore, the R
2
 within has been provided on the basis of an LSDV regression with a 
lagged dependent variable. Moreover, a specification test, based on the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals, has also been provided. If the assumption of serial independence in 
the original errors, ε´s and φ´s, is correct, the transformed residuals should not show any significant 
AR(2) test statistics. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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6.2 The NGN take-up rate model 
As described in Section 3, the take-up rate relates NGN adoption to NGN coverage. 
This index is extremely important for three reasons: first, it is a relevant indicator of 
the willingness of consumers to migrate to a new infrastructure; second, it is a 
measure of capacity utilization; third, and perhaps more important, it is a key policy 
variable defined by the EC in its DAE targets. The results reported in Section 6.1 on 
coverage and adoption show that both NGN coverage and adoption is positively 
affected by an increase in the access price to the old networks, thus implying that the 
expected effect of this price on the take-up rate is ex ante unclear. The main results 
of the static NGN take-up rate model are reported in Table 3. The F-test (F_f), at the 
bottom of Table 3, shows that country-level fixed-effects are highly significant, which 
in turn implies that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates if the fixed-
effects were correlated to the independent variables.23 Wooldridge´s test for serial 
correlation in panel data (Wooldridge, 2002) clearly indicates the presence of a first-
order serial correlation (e.g. F(1, 24) = 34.074 for the baseline model in regression 
(1)). This test is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity, which is present in the take-
up rate model specifications. Accordingly, two-way fixed-effects regressions have 
been employed with an AR(1) disturbance in regressions (1)-(4). It should be noted 
that all the demand and cost side controls have been included in regressions (1)-(4), 
as outlined in Section 5.2.  
The results show that an increase in the local loop unbundling price, llu_price, has a 
significantly negative impact on the take-up rate of NGN connections. Putting 
together the results from the previous Sections, the overall results show that both 
adoption and coverage do in fact increase with an increase in the regulated access 
price, but the effects on coverage slightly dominates the effect on the demand side 
and hence reduces the take-up rate (Hypothesis 3). This effect, though weakened 
by the simultaneous effects on adoption and coverage, is constant across the 
specifications. Accordingly, an increase in the unbundling price by 1€, increases the 
NGN take-up rate by ~ 1 percentage point. Similarly, and in line with our previous 
results, controlling for the presence of Eastern countries (regression 4) does not 
affect the results, which means that the role of the unbundling price is irrelevant in 
those countries to sustain NGN take-up. 
Most cost and demand side controls do not seem to play any relevant role, while 
fixed-mobile substitution does. The more intense the intermodal competition is, the 
lower the NGN take-up rate; this effect is also non-linear, as suggested by the model 
specifications in regressions (3)-(4). The corresponding coefficients (regression (4)) 
on the fms and fms2 variables point to an inverted U-shaped relationship, with an 
optimal level of competition intensity for fms ~ 6.18, which is well above the grand 
mean value (fms ~ 3.37 (Table A.2)). Hence, on average intermodal competition from 
mobile networks exerted a positive impact on the NGN take-up rate in the past. 
                                            
23
 A robust Hausman test clearly rejects the random effect model assumption (the Sargan-Hansen test 
results are significant at the 1% level; not reported here, but available upon request). Clearly, the 
EU27 member states do not represent a random sample drawn from the population of all countries.  
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6.3 Further robustness tests 
This section presents additional estimations that can be used to examine the 
robustness of the main results. The robustness tests refer to (i) an alternative 
estimator (fixed-effects instrumental variable (IV) estimation in regressions (1)-(3)) 
and (ii) an alternative specification of the dependent variable (ln(NGN_gap)24 in 
regression (4)). 
As described in section 4.2, the unbundling price has been instrumented with the 
price of shared access, sa_price, as well as with some other (excluded) exogenous 
cost shifters (population density, pop_dens, and the long-term interest rate, lt_ir). In 
line with the previous sections, we employ the bias-corrected LSDVC estimator for 
the dynamic NGN adoption and coverage specification in regressions (1)-(2) and the 
ordinary (LSDV) fixed-effect estimator for the static NGN take-up rate and NGN gap 
model in regressions (3)-(4). 
A first stage regression shows that the instruments are jointly highly significant (F = 
48.07). From regression (1)-(2) in Table 4, the main estimation results carry over 
quite well as regards the dynamic NGN coverage (regression (1)) and NGN adoption 
(regression (2)) models, where the “full” model specifications have been re-
estimated, as reported in Table 1 and Table 2. The same results on the unbundling 
price also show up in the IV NGN take-up rate (regression (3)) model. Focusing on 
the role of the unbundling price we re-estimated the structure of the “ull” model, as 
reported in regression (2) of Table 3. Whereas the main term is now insignificant, the 
interaction term picks-up the negative relation which is significant at the 1% level. 
As far as the ln(NGN_gap) model is concerned, supportive evidence has also been 
found on the impact of the unbundling price. The positive coefficient estimate can 
now be expected, in view of the construction of the variable ln(NGN_gap). This also 
holds for the other explanatory variables, and, in particular, the market size now 
exerts a positive and significant effect.   
                                            
24
 In order to normalize the series, logs of the dependent variable were considered. 
~ 21 ~ 
Table 3: Static take-up rate model (Dependent var.: NGN_tur) 
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 base llu fms Eastern 
Lag: llu_price -0.0097* -0.0096* -0.0102* -0.0116* 
 (-1.77) (-1.74) (-1.88) (-1.81) 
Lag: i_price_llu_sh  -0.0013   
  (-0.11)   
Lag: i_llu_price_East    0.0036 
    (0.35) 
Lag: fms -0.0280* -0.0283* 0.1119* 0.1186* 
 (-1.68) (-1.69) (1.68) (1.76) 
Lag: fms2   -0.0094** -0.0096** 
   (-2.14) (-2.17) 
Lag: bb_ne -0.9742 -0.9714 -0.9342 -1.0172 
 (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.31) 
Lag: bb_ne2 1.2196 1.2210 1.1889 1.2858 
 (1.49) (1.48) (1.48) (1.61) 
Lag: legacy 0.0021 0.0021 0.0051 0.0064 
 (0.49) (0.49) (1.12) (1.35) 
Lag: gdp 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.21) (0.22) (-0.04) (0.57) 
Lag: ln(bb_lines) 0.1502 0.1501 0.1667 0.1779 
 (1.13) (1.12) (1.26) (1.31) 
Lag: adop_bb_lines -0.3135 -0.3169 -0.2531 -0.2495 
 (-1.00) (-1.00) (-0.81) (-0.80) 
Lag: edu -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (-0.00) (0.00) (-0.05) (-1.15) 
Lag: nri 0.0799 0.0794 0.1069 0.1072 
 (1.16) (1.14) (1.53) (1.55) 
Lag: labcost_ict -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.29) 
Lag: urban_pop 0.0364 0.0366 0.0409 0.0282 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.62) (1.04) 
Lag: wage 0.0271* 0.0275* 0.0287* 0.0346** 
 (1.83) (1.82) (1.92) (2.18) 
Constant -1.0575*** -1.0650*** -1.0148*** -1.0273*** 
 (-2.91) (-2.89) (-2.89) (-2.86) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within) 0.2368 0.2378 0.2518 0.2547 
F 2.0504 1.9629 2.1170 2.0501 
F_f 2.6233 2.6220 2.4251 2.6249 
Observations 200 200 200 200 
Note that panel-by-panel Cochrane-Orcutt method decreases the number of maximum observations 
by the number of available groups. In addition, some values in our panel data set are missing, as 
pointed out in section 4. All regressions include country fixed effects and period effects. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 4: Robustness regressions (Dependent var.: (regr. (1): ln(NGN_cov); regr. 
(2): ln(NGN_adop); regr. (3): NGN_tur; regr. (4): ln(NGN_gap) 
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 cov_full_IV 
_LSDVC 
adop_full_IV 
_LSDVC 
tur_ull_IV 
_FE_robust 
ln(NGN_gap) 
_FE_AR(1) 
Lag: Dependent var. 0.6362*** 0.6534***   
 (8.50) (11.37)   
Lag: ln(llu_price) 0.1620 -0.4045   
 (0.33) (-0.92)   
Lag: llu_price   0.0083 0.1195*** 
   (1.33) (2.97) 
Lag:ln(i_price_llu_sh) 0.1538* 0.2995*** -0.0192***  
(reg (3): i_price_llu_sh) (1.66) (4.08) (-3.22)  
Lag: fms -1.0029* -0.2125* -0.0426* -0.0562 
 (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.74) (-0.29) 
Lag: fms2 0.0595    
 (1.58)    
Lag: bb_ne 3.8542 2.4236 -2.2000* -1.5749 
 (0.48) (0.38) (-1.96) (-0.34) 
Lag: bb_ne2 -8.8926 -6.3057 2.7773** 2.5772 
 (-1.04) (-1.03) (2.56) (0.50) 
Lag: legacy -0.1090*** -0.0454* 0.0074 -0.0229 
 (-3.02) (-1.81) (1.35) (-0.58) 
Lag: gdp -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.40) (-1.43) (0.89) (-0.68) 
Lag: ln(bb_lines) 0.5454 0.4030 -0.0029 1.4941** 
 (1.12) (0.86) (-0.05) (2.15) 
Lag: adop_bb_lines   -0.5342* -1.8500 
   (-1.94) (-0.80) 
Lag: edu 0.0064* 0.0580 0.0086 -0.0498 
 (1.88) (1.61) (1.01) (-0.81) 
Lag: nri -1.0308 -0.4300 -0.0365 0.2883 
 (-1.39) (-0.78) (-0.72) (0.47) 
Lag: urban_pop 0.1829 0.1562 0.0153 0.4764 
 (1.28) (1.27) (0.63) (1.24) 
Lag: wage -0.2973***  0.0297** -0.3824** 
 (-2.76)  (2.41) (-2.26) 
Lag: labcost_ict -0.0149 -0.0096 0.0012 -0.0200 
 (-1.21) (-0.82) (0.54) (-1.41) 
Constant   -1.6167 -29.5569*** 
   (-0.79) (-3.23) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within) 0.7795 0.7410 0.4032 0.1555 
F_f 12.27 8.23 7.8381 1.12 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.804 0.600   
Observations 200 196 218 216 
Estimates in regressions (1)-(3) are based on the two-stage least squares IV estimator. Regression (4) 
is based on panel-by-panel Cochrane-Orcutt method to eliminate first-order serial correlation. All 
regressions include country fixed effects and period effects. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are bootstrapped in regressions (1)-(2) and robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in regression (3); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to provide evidence on a hotly debated issue, i.e. 
how to simultaneously incentivize the adoption and the investment in next generation 
broadband technology. In particular, the focus of the paper has been on the potential 
role of the access price on the old broadband infrastructure, which is set directly by 
NRAs and acts as a key policy variable to speed up investment and the adoption of 
new ultra-fast broadband connections. 
Results show that NGN coverage and adoption are characterized by the presence of 
path dependency: this implies that policies aimed at fostering retail migration are 
important to sustain demand expansion. At the same time, the existing access price 
regulation, i.e. the LLU price, could affect NGN adoption indirectly, albeit 
considerably. The data show that relaxing the LLU regulation, i.e. allowing an 
increase in access prices for the old legacy infrastructures, could help to support a 
demand expansion and reduce the price differentials between the prices of standard 
broadband services and the NGN-based ones. However, we found that there is 
considerable heterogeneity among EU member states implying, in particular, that the 
impact of unbundling policies are strongly weakened in Eastern European countries, 
where the regulated old broadband infrastructures are much less developed. 
Furthermore, the effect of an increase in the LLU access price is greater for NGN 
coverage than for adoption, thus widening the gap between adoption and coverage 
and therefore reducing the take-up rate. In other words, although it positively affects 
NGN adoption and NGN coverage, an increase in LLU prices could also generate 
extra-capacity without enhancing sufficient ultra-fast broadband demand, thus 
implying that, on the demand side, additional policies are needed to sustain demand 
expansion. This result is reminiscent of Tinbergen´s maxim according to which the 
number of policy instruments must be equal to the number of policy targets. 
Consequently, in order to achieve the mid-term dual DAE goals, both the demand 
and the supply sides of the European broadband markets need to be stimulated. 
Significant investments in telecom and/or cable infrastructure are needed on the 
supply side in order to enable much higher internet speeds. Instead, on the demand 
side, the consumers need to be persuaded about the potential benefits of new 
applications that make use of these higher speeds and need to be offered affordable 
prices in order to subscribe, e.g. via vouchers, tax deductions or other public demand 
stimuli. Only on the assumption that development of content and applications will 
autonomously evolve sufficient demand after the necessary infrastructure has 
already been put in place and the welfare loss due to slower migration is not too 
large, the negative impact of the access price on the take-up rate can be considered 
as a second-order effect. 
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Annex 
Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 and Figures A.1 and A.2. 
Table A.1: Description of the variables and sources 
Variable Description Source 
 
Dependent variables 
 
NGN coverage 
NGN_cov 
(household weighted) 
 
Total number of homes passed by FTTx 
technologies (Fibre-to-the-home; Fibre-to-the-
building; Fibre-to-the-curb; Fibre-to-the-last 
amplifier/DOCSIS 3.0). “Homes passed” refers to 
the total number of premises. “Premises” is a home 
or place of business, normalized to each country’s 
total number of households. 
FTTH Council 
Europe
 
Euromonitor 
(households) 
NGN adoption 
NGN_adop 
(household weighted) 
 
Total number of subscribers in terms of “homes 
connected” by FTTx technologies. “Subscribers” 
refers to premises that uses at least one service in 
this connection under a commercial contract, 
normalized to each country’s total number of 
households.  
FTTH Council 
Europe
 
 
NGN take-up rate, 
NGN_tur 
Ratio between NGN adoption and NGN coverage. FTTH Council 
Europe 
NGN gap 
NGN_gap 
Difference between NGN coverage and NGN 
adoption. 
FTTH Council 
Europe
 
 Main explanatory variables: Regulation  
Average total cost of 
the full LLU, 
llu_price  
Monthly average total cost of the full LLU in €. EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
Average cost of 
shared access, 
sa_price 
Monthly average total cost of shared access in €. EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 Main explanatory variables: Competition  
Entrant's market 
share, 
bb_ne 
New entrant's retail market share in fixed broadband 
lines. 
Communication 
Committee 
(COCOM) 
Mobile-to-fixed ratio, 
fms  
Ratio of Mobile Lines to Fixed Lines (Absolute). Market Line Extract 
Fixed legacy, 
legacy  
Total number of active fixed landlines per 100 
inhabitants. An active line connects the subscriber’s 
terminal equipment to the public switched telephone 
network PSTN lines. 
ITU 
Share of LLU lines, 
ms_llu  
Share of unbundled local loop lines to the total retail 
broadband lines.  
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
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Table A.1 ctd. 
 Demand control variables  
Broadband lines, 
bb_lines 
 
Number of total retail broadband connections based 
on DSL and coax cable that enable a higher than 
144 Kbit/s download speed but exclude FTTx lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
Broadband adoption, 
adop_bb_lines 
Number of total broadband connections adopted by 
consumers divided by total population. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
Networked Readiness 
Index, 
nri 
Propensity of a country to exploit the opportunities 
offered by information and communication 
technology (ICT). 
Euromonitor 
Education, 
edu 
Percentage of population having attained secondary 
or higher education, for the population aged 25 to 64 
years. 
Eurostat 
GDP per capita, 
gdp  
 
GDP per capita (total) and PPP adjusted to current 
US$. 
World Bank
 
Euromonitor
 
(population) 
 Cost control variables  
Hourly wage, 
wage 
The manufacturing wage per hour in € and current 
prices with fixed 2012 exchange rates. 
Euromonitor 
Labour cost, 
labcost_ict  
Annual labour cost index for the Information and 
Communication branch by NACE Rev. 2 normalized 
to 100 in 2008. The index measures the 
development of the total cost, on an hourly basis, to 
employ the labour force, and it includes wages and 
salaries, social security contributions and taxes, but 
excludes subsidies. 
Eurostat 
Urban population, 
urban_pop  
Population of a country that lives in an urban 
environment as a percentage of the total population.  
MarketLine 
Population density 
pop_dens 
Population density in number of inhabitants per 
Square Kilometre. 
Market Line Extract 
Long-term interest 
rate, 
lt_ir 
Long-term interest rate for debt security issued after 
10 years of maturity at the local currency unit rate.  
European Central 
Bank 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NGN_adop 296 0.0730204 0.1090571 0 0.5471706 
NGN_cov 296 0.3830631 0.4678066 .4678066 2.306572 
NGN_tur 226 0.2199841 0.1641123 0.0000517 0.7222222 
NGN_gap 296 0.2651446 0.2945837 0 0.9983765 
llu_price 266 11.45305 4.303125 5.28 42 
sa_price 266 5.397406 3.431645 0.74 23.89 
fms 270 3.371881 1.667801 1.2819 10.9396 
bb_ne 267 0.501393 0.1558175 0 1 
legacy 270 40.41304 13.08719 13.86 66.38055 
bb_lines 267 3723236 5769546 13738 27960396 
ms_llu  266 0.1064223 0.1461762 0 0.6772212 
nri 270 4.578519 .6294371 3.2 6 
gdp 270 30200.01 13641.82 8730.803 90789.65 
edu 270 73.53926 16.01936 23.6 93.4 
wage 270 11.05556 7.861194 0.8 38.7 
urban_pop 270 72.43043 11.89043 49.4118 97.4945 
labcost_ict 270 99.84741 15.33449 47.9 163.5 
pop_dens 270 174.247 237.3405 17.1923 1285.241 
lt_ir 296 4.50125 2.227483 0.22 22.5 
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Table A.3: Direct Granger-causality tests  
Since Granger-causality tests include several lags of the right-hand side variable, 
including the lagged dependent variable, the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-in-
difference GMM estimator has been employed with a maximum number of three lags 
of the right-hand side variables and internal instruments. Period effects have been 
included. Granger-causality tests are Wald tests of the joint significance of the 
respective coefficients which are χ2 distributed. The standard errors have been 
adjusted for clustering within countries and are robust to heteroscedasticity; the p-
values are reported.  
GMM (NGN adoption) p-value H0: β1, β2 = 0 Answer 
Does the LLU price cause NGN adoption? 
Does NGN adoption cause LLU price? 
0.0077 
0.2890 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
    
Do new BB entrants market share cause NGN adoption? 
Does NGN adoption cause new BB entrants market share? 
0.2078 
0.7779 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
    
Does fixed to mobile substitution rate cause NGN adoption? 
Does NGN adoption cause fixed to mobile substitution rate? 
0.1365 
0.7434 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
    
Does the no. of active fixed landlines cause NGN adoption? 
Does NGN adoption cause the no. of active fixed landlines? 
0.0632 
0.7600 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
GMM (NGN coverage) p-value H0: β1, β2 = 0 Answer 
Does the LLU price cause NGN coverage? 
Does NGN coverage cause LLU price? 
0.0316 
0.7613 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
    
Do new BB entrants market share cause NGN coverage? 
Does NGN coverage cause new BB entrants market share? 
0.3365 
0.8522 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
    
Does fixed to mobile substitution rate cause NGN coverage? 
Does NGN coverage cause fixed mobile substitution rate? 
0.0011 
0.6111 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
    
Does the no. of active fixed landlines cause NGN coverage? 
Does NGN coverage cause the no. of active fixed landlines? 
0.0066 
0.5930 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
GMM (NGN take-up rate) p-value H0: β1, β2 = 0 Answer 
Does the LLU price cause NGN take-up rate? 
Does the NGN take-up rate cause LLU price? 
0.0865 
0.7138 
Rejected 
Not Rejected 
Yes 
No 
    
Do new BB entrants market share cause NGN take-up rate? 
Does the NGN take-up rate cause new BB entrants market 
share? 
0.9207 
0.9941 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
    
Does the FMS rate cause NGN take-up rate? 
Does the NGN take-up rate cause FMS rate? 
0.9986 
0.9967 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
    
Does the no. of active fixed landlines cause NGN take-up 
rate? 
Does the NGN take-up rate cause the no. of active fixed 
landlines? 
0.8553 
0.6951 
Not Rejected 
Not Rejected 
No 
No 
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Figure A.1: NGN coverage, adoption and take-up rates in the average EU member state 
(Source: FTTH Council Europe)  
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Figure A.2: NGN adoption, coverage and take-up: EU15 vs. Eastern European 
countries (Source: FTTH Council Europe) 
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